Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social
Justice
Volume 5
Issue 2 Issue 2

Article 4

2016

ELIGIBILITY FOR COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL IN STATE
CRIMINAL CASES: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE INDIGENCY
STATUTES
Susan L. Wynne
College of Criminal Justice at Sam Houston State University, slw001@shsu.edu

Michael S. Vaughn
Sam Houston State University, MSV002@shsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/rgsj

Recommended Citation
Wynne, Susan L. and Vaughn, Michael S. (2016) "ELIGIBILITY FOR COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL IN
STATE CRIMINAL CASES: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE INDIGENCY STATUTES," Tennessee Journal of Race,
Gender, & Social Justice: Vol. 5 : Iss. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/rgsj/vol5/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Volunteer, Open Access, Library Journals (VOL Journals),
published in partnership with The University of Tennessee (UT) University Libraries. This article has been accepted
for inclusion in Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice by an authorized editor. For more information,
please visit https://trace.tennessee.edu/rgsj.

ELIGIBILITY FOR COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL IN STATE
CRIMINAL CASES:
AN ANALYSIS OF STATE INDIGENCY STATUTES
Susan L. Wynne*1
Michael S. Vaughn, Ph.D.*2
ABSTRACT
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and a series of U.S.
Supreme Court cases have secured the right to counsel for
defendants facing incarceration. Neither the Sixth Amendment nor
the Supreme Court cases, however, provide guidance on how
eligibility for court-appointed counsel should be determined. This
Article analyzes state statutes to determine the extent to which
state legislatures have enacted statutory guidance regarding how
decisions for court-appointed counsel are made. Results indicate
that legislative direction for eligibility decisions varies widely, and
many statutes lack objective eligibility criteria. The Article
concludes that leaving broad discretion to state judges presents
risks for abuse and threats to defendants’ rights.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel provision has been a part of
American constitutional law since 1791, but it was not originally interpreted to
give government-subsidized counsel to those who could not afford it.3 While
twelve of the original thirteen United States colonies recognized a defendant’s
right to counsel in serious cases, rejecting English common law,4 the
“protections” afforded by these colonies were not always applied in a manner that
ensured a defendant’s rights were adequately safeguarded.5 In fact, the practical
implications of the right to counsel for indigent criminal defendants did not
emerge until the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Powell v. Alabama in
3

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1932).
5
Id. at 60. Justice Sutherland wrote that in an obvious “perversion of all sense of proportion,”
English common law rule dictated that defendants facing less serious, misdemeanor offenses were
entitled to the “full assistance of counsel,” while those charged with treason or another felony
were denied that assistance. Id.
4
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1932.6 With the Powell decision, the Court opened the door for more meaningful
right to counsel protections by incorporating the Sixth Amendment through the
application of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.7 This decision
secured the right to counsel for defendants accused of capital crimes in state and
federal proceedings. This right would then grow over the next thirty years during
which the Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright 8 and Argersinger v. Hamlin.9
These cases, together with others, secured the right to counsel for all criminal
defendants facing potential loss of liberty.
Despite these critical judicial decisions that changed the theoretical
landscape of procedural justice in this country, the Court has never provided
practical guidance regarding how the right to counsel should be institutionalized.
The work of fleshing out the detail regarding how, when, and for whom the right
should be afforded has been left to the federal and state legislatures and lower
courts. Absent additional guidance from the Supreme Court or other central
authority, the determination of indigency has been left in the hands of the states,
and while states use some of the same factors in that determination, no two states
employ exactly the same criteria. It, therefore, would be a “gross overgeneralization” to say that there is one typical system employed by a majority of
states to determine indigency.10 A review of the extant literature regarding the
right to counsel suggests that some jurisdictions have had more success than
others in implementing and maintaining indigent defense systems.11 The
literature reveals that, today, more than five decades after the Supreme Court’s
landmark ruling in Gideon v. Wainright, the nation’s indigent defense systems are
in a state of crisis due, in large part, to heavy caseloads and severe underfunding.12 State public defender systems have been the target of most of the
6

287 U.S. 45 (1932).
See id.
8
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
9
407 U.S. 25 (1972).
10
Adam M. Gershowitz, The Invisible Pillar of Gideon, 80 IND. L.J. 571, 581 (2005).
11
See, e.g., COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., FINAL REPORT TO THE CHIEF
JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (2006) (reporting on serious problems with the state of New
York’s indigent defense system and proposing several recommendations to address the problems
identified by the Commission); Jessa DeSimone, Bucking Conventional Wisdom: The Montana
Public Defender Act, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1479 (2006) (reporting on the successful
transformation of the Montana public defender system and citing cases that highlight problems
with indigent defense systems of Louisiana, Arizona, and Oklahoma); Justine Finney Guyer,
Saving Missouri’s Public Defender System: A Call for Adequate Legislative Funding, 74 MO. L.
REV. 335 (2009) (discussing the shortcomings of Missouri’s public defense delivery system); Lisa
R. Pruitt & Beth A. Colgan, Justice Deserts: Spatial Inequality and Local Funding of Indigent
Defense, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 219 (2010) (examining funding level variations and the impact of the
variations on public defender service delivery in five Arizona counties and concluding, in part,
that “Arizona’s nonmetropolitan counties are at a greater risk of systematic deprivation of
adequate council than their urban counterparts.”).
12
See, e.g., Harvard Law Review Association, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to
Address Underfunded Indigent Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (2005); Robert L.
Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United States, 58 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 31 (1995); Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent
Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFFALO L. REV. 329 (1995); American Bar
Association Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, Gideon’s Broken Promise:
7
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criticism, and some authors cite similar problems in the federal system.13
As described below, the focus of existing literature is almost exclusively
on the crisis over ineffectiveness of counsel and solutions aimed at adding
funding or increasing performance standards for attorneys.14 Relatively little
attention is given to the study of the methods by which eligibility for courtappointed counsel is determined.15 Understanding how determinations of
eligibility are made is important because these decisions play the most significant
role in ensuring the right to counsel for defendants who cannot afford to hire their
own attorneys.
Thus, the implications for establishing a balanced and
standardized approach to eligibility determination are significant. In the absence
of relatively objective and uniform standards, eligibility determinations are made
more subjectively, increasing the risk of inequality in the appointment of
counsel.16 A lack of uniformity in determining indigency could result in similarly
situated defendants being treated unequally with respect to their Sixth
Amendment rights.17 Further, without the ability to obtain counsel on their own,
defendants may be forced to represent themselves,18 leading to a risk of worse
case outcomes,19 including more convictions and longer sentences—concerns not
shared by adequately represented defendants.20 On the other hand, if people

America’s Continuing Quest for Equal Justice (2004),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_scl
aid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf.
13
See, e.g., John J. Cleary, Federal Defender Services: Serving the System or the Client? 58 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 65 (1995) (citing similar problems in the federal system that plague state
systems). But see Igna L. Parsons, "Making it a Federal Case": A Model for Indigent
Representation, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 837 (1997) (arguing that the federal system exemplifies
a model or best practice approach).
14
See infra Part III.
15
Id.
16
See, e.g., Carrie Savage Phillips, Oklahoma’s Indigency Determination Scheme: A Call for
Uniformity, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 655, 662-63 (2014) (arguing that while allowing judges “to exercise
broad discretion in determining indigency status” permits the flexibility that is sometimes required
for dealing with special cases, it also “encourage[s] . . . [or] perhaps even require[s] . . . judges to
incorporate their own unique views in rendering a decision” which results in a lack of uniformity
and compromises valued principles in our legal system of equal treatment and predictability).
17
Id. at 655.
18
Ben Kempinen, Dealing Fairly with An Unrepresented Person, 78 WIS. LAW. 12 (2005) (noting
that “[i]n criminal matters, notwithstanding a right to counsel grounded in the U.S. and Wisconsin
constitutions, many accused persons remain unrepresented because they cannot afford to retain
private counsel and do not meet prevailing indigency standards”).
19
George C. Thomas III, How Gideon v. Wainwright Became Goldilocks, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
307, 308 (2015) (arguing that “worse outcomes” at an “instrumental level” suggests fewer
acquittals, fewer dismissals, and better plea deals with shorter sentences).
20
Erwin Chemerinsky, Lessons from Gideon, 122 YALE L. J. 2676, 2678 (2013) (arguing that “[i]n
a criminal justice system where almost all convictions are gained by guilty pleas–ninety-seven
percent in federal court and ninety-four percent in state court–the presence of defense attorneys
surely often makes an enormous difference in the nature of the plea deal and the length of the
sentence”); see also Jona Goldschmidt & Don Stemen, Patterns and Trends in Federal Pro Se
Defense, 1996-2011: An Exploratory Study, 8 FED. CTS. L. REV. 81, 107 (2015) (concluding that,
while pro se defendants in federal criminal cases were more likely to have their cases dismissed
than those with appointed or retained counsel, pro se defendants were less likely to be acquitted
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capable of paying for their own counsel are found eligible for court-appointed
counsel, unnecessary stresses will be added to already overloaded public defender
systems.
The purpose of this Article is to determine how states make
determinations of eligibility for court-appointed counsel for indigent criminal
defendants. Specifically, through a comprehensive analysis of relevant state
statutes, this Article seeks to identify the legislative parameters in state courts
within which the decisions of eligibility for counsel are made for criminal
defendants. Results indicate that legislative direction for eligibility decisions
varies widely, and many statutes lack objective eligibility criteria. This Article
concludes that the lack of adequate legislative guidance leaves broad discretion to
state judges, which presents risks for decisions regarding indigency that threaten
defendants’ equal protection guarantees and Sixth Amendment rights.
II.

EVOLUTION OF SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL

Deriving from English common law, the concept that criminal defendants
have a right to attorney assistance against government prosecution was formally
enshrined in the United States with the addition of the Bill of Rights to the
Constitution in 1791. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution states, in part,
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to…have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”21 The true connotation of that
constitutional language did not take shape until the Supreme Court ruled that the
Fourteenth Amendment extended the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the
states.22 The Court’s involvement in fleshing out the contours of the right to
counsel began with Powell v. Alabama in 193223 and Johnson v. Zerbst in 1938,24
and would continue to expand through the procedural due process era of the
Warren Court with Gideon v. Wainright25 and Argersinger v. Hamlin.26
A.

Powell v. Alabama

Powell v. Alabama marked the first time the Supreme Court dealt directly
with the right to counsel, and it did so in the racially and politically charged
South.27 On appeal for violations of the Sixth Amendment, the Court reversed the
convictions of eight pro se black males convicted of raping two white girls.28
Writing for the majority, Justice Sutherland found “the necessity of counsel was
so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial court to make an effective
than defendants with retained counsel and were more likely to be found guilty by a jury or trial
court than defendants with appointed or retained counsel).
21
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
22
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
23
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
24
304 U.S. 458 (1938).
25
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
26
407 U.S. 25 (1972).
27
See Powell, 287 U.S. at 72.
28
Id.
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appointment of counsel was . . . a denial of due process within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”29 While the Court limited the reach of the decision to
defendants in state and federal capital cases, Powell represented a monumental
step toward procedural fairness through the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
B.

Johnson v. Zerbst

The next significant step on the evolutionary map toward the maturation
of the right to counsel was Johnson v. Zerbst.30 Defendant Johnson was tried and
convicted of possessing and passing counterfeit money without the assistance of
counsel.31 Upon review of Johnson’s habeas corpus petition, the Supreme Court
concluded that the “Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with
crime to the assistance of counsel, [and] compliance with this constitutional
mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court's authority to
deprive an accused of his life or liberty.”32 With its decision in this case, the
Court extended the right to counsel established in Powell to all criminal
defendants facing federal prosecution.
C.

Betts v. Brady

The Court next got the chance to review the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel and the incorporation of those rights under the Fourteenth Amendment in
Betts v. Brady.33 Indicted for robbery, the state trial judge denied Betts’ request
for court-appointed counsel for trial because the county only appointed counsel
for defendants on trial for rape or murder.34 Betts pled not guilty, represented
himself, and was convicted of robbery and sentenced to eight years in prison.35
Upon review of Betts’ petition for habeas relief, the Supreme Court declined to
extend the Sixth Amendment right to counsel via the Fourteenth Amendment’s
due process clause to non-capital state defendants.36 In a strongly worded dissent,
Justice Black noted that “[d]enial to the poor of the request for counsel in
proceedings based on charges of serious crime has long been regarded as
shocking to the ‘universal sense of justice’ throughout this country.”37 Further,
Justice Black suggested that a judicially approved practice should “assure that no
man . . . be deprived of counsel merely because of his poverty . . . [and] [a]ny
other practice seems to . . . defeat the promise of our democratic society to
provide equal justice under the law.”38

29

Id. at 65.
304 U.S. 458 (1938).
31
Id. at 459.
32
Id. at 467.
33
316 U.S. 455 (1942).
34
Id. at 456.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 473.
37
Id. at 476 (Black, J., dissenting).
38
Id. at 477 (Black, J., dissenting).
30
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Gideon v. Wainwright

Twelve years later in a case with very similar facts, Justice Black was
vindicated through the Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainwright.39 Defendant
Gideon was arrested and charged in a Florida state court with breaking and
entering into a pool hall with the intent to commit a misdemeanor.40 He appeared
in court without an attorney and without funds to hire one, and he asked the judge
to appoint one for him.41 The trial judge, abiding by the Court’s decision in Betts,
denied the request, citing that courts can only appoint counsel for defendants
charged with capital crimes.42 Gideon proceeded pro se, insisting that he was
innocent, but the jury convicted and sentenced him to five years in prison.43 Upon
review of Gideon’s writ of habeas corpus, a unanimous Supreme Court overruled
Betts and reversed Gideon’s conviction.44 Justice Black authored the opinion,
noting that the Court got it wrong in Betts, and in reversing that decision held that
the right to counsel is a fundamental right essential to a fair trial.45
E.

Argersinger v. Hamlin and Beyond

With Gideon, the Court extended the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to
state non-capital defendants through the Fourteenth Amendment, and nine years
later in Argersinger v. Hamlin, the Court confirmed that the right was not only
reserved for felony defendants.46 In Argersinger, the Court held that the right to
counsel was not governed by the classification of the offense, and that any
defendant who faces deprivation of liberty as the result of any criminal
prosecution, whether felony or misdemeanor, has the right to assistance of
counsel.47
Despite these landmark decisions, which doctrinally secured the right to
counsel for defendants facing loss of liberty, the Court has never defined
indigency or addressed the issue of how the right is to be practically
implemented.48 Instead, the work of fleshing out the practicable details regarding
how, when, and for whom the right should be afforded has been left to the federal
and state legislatures and lower courts. As a result, fifty-one disparate federal and
state public defender systems have developed with little or no centralized
39

372 U.S. 335 (1963).
372 U.S. 335, 336 (1963).
41
Id. at 337.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 344-45.
46
407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972).
47
Id.
48
See, e.g., Allison D. Kuhns, If You Cannot Afford an Attorney, Will One Be Appointed for You?:
How (Some) States Force Criminal Defendants to Choose between Posting Bond and Getting a
Court-Appointed Attorney, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1787, 1798 (2012); Paul Marcus, Why the United
States Supreme Court Got Some (But Not A Lot) of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
Analysis Right, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 142, 153-154 (2009); Phillips, supra note 14, at 657.
40
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guidance. Thus, the nature of indigent defense in this country varies widely. For
example, while more than half of the states have public defender systems that are
organized as statewide systems,49 fourteen states delegate the responsibility for
public defense to counties or groups of counties that comprise a judicial district.50
The remaining states’ indigent defense delivery systems are operated under a type
of hybrid of the state and county systems.51 The methods for providing courtappointed attorneys also differ across various jurisdictions; some systems assign
private defense attorneys from a rotation list or on an ad-hoc basis, while other
systems enter into contracts with attorneys, bar associations, or non-profit
organizations, which provide court-appointed counsel.52 Most jurisdictions, and
virtually all of those with over 750,000 residents, operate public defender
programs, which are operated as government or non-profit organizations with
full-time staff attorneys and support personnel dedicated to defense services in the
jurisdiction.53 States also use various means to fund their indigent defense
delivery systems; some states provide all of the necessary funding for both county
and state-based systems, while other county-based systems are funded solely
through county funds derived from court costs or other user fees.54 Note too that
many state systems utilize some combination of these funding methods.55
With all of the various systems and methods that exist for the provision of
indigent defense, it is perhaps no surprise to find that states have also adopted
different methods for determining how eligibility for court-appointed counsel is
determined. This important aspect of indigent defense, however, has received
very little attention in the extant literature.56
III.

THE FOCUS OF THE EXTANT LITERATURE

The existing literature related to the delivery of indigent defense services
is replete with examples illustrating that the nation’s public defender systems are
in a “perpetual” state of crisis.57 The primary reason for the crisis cited by legal
49

Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United States, 58
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 37 (1995).
50
Id. at 40.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 32.
53
Id. at 36.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 41.
56
But see Gershowitz, supra note 8 (addressing the issue of eligibility determination in the states
and is mentioned further in the following section of this paper); John P. Gross, Too Poor to Hire a
Lawyer but Not Indigent: How States Use the Federal Poverty Guidelines to Deprive Defendants
of their Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1173 (2013); and Phillips,
supra note 14.
57
See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance after
Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L. J. 2150 (2013); DeSimone, supra note 9; Harvard Law
Review Association, Gideon's Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent
Defense, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2062 (2000); Richard Klein, Symposium Gideon–A Generation
Later: The Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1433 (1999);
NATIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMMITTEE, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT
OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2009).
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scholars and interest groups is the fact that many of these systems are severely
under-funded. 58 The under-funding of public defender programs leads to a
number of untenable consequences, each of which is given attention in the
literature. A lack of adequate funds results in lower salaries for public defenders,
which makes recruiting and retaining qualified attorneys difficult because it
discourages attorneys–many with enormous law school debts–from participating
in the system at all.59 This can lead to a shortage of qualified attorneys to staff the
public defender systems.60 The attorneys that remain to provide indigent defense
services are faced with unmanageably large caseloads and often do not have the
time or resources to provide competent assistance,61 and attempts to manage the
caseload lead to very limited contact with defendants and rushed plea-deals.62 In
fact, some argue that the refusal of states to address the under-funding of indigent
defense systems has led to systemic neglect of indigent defendants and their
rights.63 This results in some deserving defendants being denied meaningful
counsel;64 some defendants refer to court-appointed attorneys as “public
pretenders.”65 One legal scholar noted that the effects of thinly stretched
defenders become particularly evident during the sentencing phase of trials, where
defenders often “disappear,” making the prosecutor’s job of obtaining harsh
punishments much easier.66
The problem of underfunding for indigent defense is serious, and the
effects go beyond a shortage of attorneys. Additional effects include insufficient
funds for trial resources such as expert, investigative, and support services, which
leads to disparity in resources available to the prosecution compared to the
defense. This can be brought to bear on cases involving indigent defendants.67
58

See, e.g., Rodger Citron, (Un)Luckey v. Miller: The Case for a Structural Injunction to Improve
Indigent Defense Services, 101 YALE L.J. 481 (1991); Harvard Law Review Association, supra
note 10, at 1731-32; Vick, supra note 10; American Bar Association, Standing Comm. on Legal
Aid & Indigent Defendants, supra note 10, at 7-13; Klein, supra note 55, at 1435.
59
See, e.g., American Bar Association Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants,
supra note 10, at 9-10.
60
See, e.g., American Bar Association Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants,
supra note 10, at 10; Stephen F. Hanlon, Boots on the Ground: State Constitutional Challenges to
Indigent Defense Systems, 75 MO. L. REV. 751, 759 (2010) (citing a shortage of attorneys in
Massachusetts willing to take appointments to defend indigent defendants due to very low hourly
rates); Citron, supra note 56, at 484-85.
61
See, e.g., American Bar Association Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants,
supra note 10, at 7, 17-18. Citron, supra note 56, at 484-85.
62
See, e.g., American Bar Association Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants,
supra note 10, at 16.
63
Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal Ethics Perspective, 52
EMORY L.J. 1169 (2003).
64
Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 10, at 1734.
65
Cara H. Drinan, The National Right to Counsel Act: A Congressional Solution to the Nation’s
Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487 (2010) (citing testimony of Alan J. Crotzer, a
wrongfully convicted Florida criminal defendant, before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, in which Crotzer testified, “[w]e have a saying for
public defenders in Florida: ‘public pretenders’”).
66
Vick, supra note 10, at 426.
67
American Bar Association Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, supra note
10, at 21-22.
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The lack of funding can also mean that attorneys involved in indigent defense
operate in environments with “no provision for formal, systematic training”
despite the complexity of the cases they handle.68 The effects of underfunding
negatively impact the quality of services received by indigent clients.69 This
problem is amplified by the lack of uniform performance standards for which
public defenders can be held accountable.70 Ultimately, these factors combine to
threaten the Sixth Amendment by compromising the effectiveness of counsel in
violation of the Court’s holding in McMann v. Richardson, in which it was
established that the right to counsel set forth in the Sixth Amendment must be
construed as the right to effective assistance of counsel.71
While most of the existing literature related to the nation’s indigent
defense systems focuses broadly on the systemic problems referred to above,
some are more narrowly concentrated, providing case studies which highlight
specific systems that are failing to succeed,72 or have been recently overhauled.73
In a recent comprehensive review of the past, present, and future of the Texas
indigent defense system, the authors noted the need for the legislature to revise
the criteria for determining indigent status to effectuate more efficient, accurate
results.74 Specifically, the authors suggested the benefits of utilizing information
from other government entities that provide assistance, such as housing
assistance, food stamps, and county-subsidized healthcare, in order to make
determinations for eligibility for court-appointed counsel.75 Additionally, in a
recent review of Wisconsin’s indigent defense system, the author noted among
many other problems that the criteria “established by the legislature to determine
eligibility for a state public defender were flawed from the start . . . [and the]
legislature's failure to update the eligibility criteria over the last 20 years has . . .
[resulted in] thousands of Wisconsin's poor fac[ing] criminal charges without the
assistance of counsel—thus, violating a fundamental right guaranteed by both our
state and federal constitutions.”76
Where the factors affecting the determination of indigency are addressed
in the literature, there seems to be a consensus that these factors employed by
68

Id. at 11.
See, e.g., id. at 14-20; see also Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 10, at 1734.
70
American Bar Association Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, supra note
10, at 10-11, 13-14.
71
397 U.S. 759, 771. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 55, at 1435-36.
72
See, e.g., David A. Felice, Justice Rationed: A Look at Alabama's Present Indigent Defense
System with a Vision Towards Change, 52 ALA. L. REV. 975 (2001); Lola Velazquez-Aguilu, Not
Poor Enough: Why Wisconsin’s System For Providing Indigent Defense is Failing, 2006 WIS. L.
REV. 193 (2006); See also Parsons, supra note 11 (pointing out positive perspectives on the
federal criminal justice system).
73
DeSimone, supra note 9 (reviewing the overhaul of the Montana public defender system
following a constitutional court challenge by the ACLU); see also Catherine Greene Burnett,
Michael K. Moore, & Allan K. Butcher, In Pursuit of Independent, Qualified, and Effective
Counsel: The Past and Future of Indigent Criminal Defense in Texas, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 595
(2001).
74
Burnett, et al., supra note 71.
75
Id. at 679.
76
Velazquez-Aguilu, supra note 70, at 236.
69
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some states can contribute to the problems that plague indigent defense systems.
In addition to the state-specific studies cited above, the American Bar
Association’s 2004 study of indigent defense systems cited unduly restrictive and
outdated eligibility standards, resulting in many indigent defendants not receiving
the assistance of counsel.77
In an article that addressed the factors states consider to determine
eligibility for counsel, Gross found that a majority of states use the Federal
Poverty Guidelines, which are based on guidance from legislation, administrative
rules, or agency practices.78 Gross argued, however, that to use “something as
arbitrary as the Federal Poverty Guidelines” was “bad public policy.”79 He
concluded that “guidelines based on the percentage of a household’s income spent
on food” may be useful in assessing eligibility for some social programs, doing so
for determining eligibility for assigned counsel “ignores economic realities.”80
In a review of the Oklahoma indigency determination scheme, Phillips
argued that the method employed by that state is flawed because it grants trial
judges broad discretion that could result in similarly situated defendants being
treated differently under the Sixth Amendment.81 Phillips argued that the
Oklahoma system should be altered to decrease judicial discretion by transferring
the authority for indigency decisions to the state’s public defender commission.82
Phillips also recommended that the state implement a new method of determining
eligibility for court-appointed counsel by creating a more objective predetermined
points-based system, which considers the 10 factors that Oklahoma lawmakers
consider relevant to a person’s financial condition—including income, assets,
debts/liabilities, living expenses, and number of dependents among others.83
Coupled with a provision that allows flexibility in unusual cases or cases with
unforeseen circumstances, Phillips concluded that such a system would provide
for greater uniformity in indigency determinations.84
Recognizing the important role that the process for determining eligibility
for court-appointed counsel has on an efficient, fair, and high-quality indigent
defense delivery system, Fabelo suggested a review of that component of the
system as a part of a comprehensive policy research strategy.85 Fabelo
specifically noted that lacking from the current body of research with respect to
the delivery of indigent defense services were considerations of who should be
covered by the system, how requests for counsel should be screened, and whether
eligibility should be limited to narrow populations of indigent defendants or
broadened to allow for partial eligibility for defendants who can contribute to the
77

American Bar Association Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, supra note
10, at 12.
78
Gross, supra note 54, at 1193-94.
79
Id. at 1218.
80
Id. at 1218.
81
Phillips, supra note 14, at 686.
82
Id. at 686.
83
Id. at 659-60, 686.
84
Id. at 686.
85
Tony Fabelo, What Policy-makers Need to Know to Improve Indigent Defense Systems, 29
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 135, 146-49 (2004).
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costs of their defense.86
Addressing a portion of this proposed research strategy, Gershowitz
conducted a review of the eligibility criteria contained within state statutes and
broadly categorized the criteria contained in the statutes by the degree of
discretion afforded to the court in making eligibility determinations.87 He
concluded that states have adopted a wide range of eligibility criteria, and most
troubling was the lack of a “constitutional floor” or minimum threshold for
presumptive determinations of eligibility for court-appointed counsel.
Gershowitz argued that absent such a threshold, states would “define away the
right to appointed counsel.”88
The current Article builds upon the works of Gross, Phillips, Fabelo, and
Gershowitz by expanding the review of state statutes beyond simple eligibility
criteria to several statutory components, reflecting the entire process by which
determinations to appoint counsel are made. Through a more comprehensive
review of both the eligibility factors and the process by which eligibility is
determined, a clearer picture emerges reflecting states’ approach to assigning
court-appointed counsel. From that picture, it is possible to more fully discern the
nature of discretion afforded judges and other government officials and the
concomitant risk posed for abuse and discriminatory practices and to defendants’
Constitutional rights.
IV.

THE REVIEW OF STATE STATUTES

Broadly stated, the purpose of the right to counsel as well as the numerous
other rights provided for in the Bill of Rights is a fair and just rule of government.
More narrowly, the underlying goal of the right to counsel and the relevant
Supreme Court decisions is to level the proverbial playing field in court
proceedings between the government and the defendant, and among all classes of
defendants notwithstanding wealth, gender, race or other personal characteristics.
The goal of the eligibility determination process should be to ensure that every
person that cannot afford an attorney is appropriately identified and
accommodated. At the same time, abuse of the system by those who can pay for
all or a portion of their defense costs should be controlled to the extent possible to
protect tight government budgets and restrict unnecessary expenditure of taxpayer
funds. With these principles in mind, the process used to determine which
defendants should be granted government-subsidized counsel must be as objective
as possible. Some flexibility must be preserved in order to address issues that
may arise in extraordinary cases; however, the establishment of a standard
determination process with clear, objectively based criteria limits unchecked
abuses of discretion and helps achieve procedural fairness.
Statutory provisions are just one of several ways that states can set forth
the parameters within which decisions for court-appointed counsel should be
86

Id. at 147.
Gershowitz, supra note 8, at 586.
88
Id.
87
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made. Others include the establishment of agency administrative rules or
regulations such as those promulgated by judicial councils and public defender
agencies or commissions. The judicial decisions of state trial and appellate courts
serve to fill in the gaps left by both statutes and administrative guidelines. State
legislatures, however, should establish the framework that guides the eligibility
determination process toward ensuring procedural fairness.
The purpose of this Article is to determine how states make
determinations of eligibility for court-appointed counsel for indigent criminal
defendants. Through the identification and review of relevant state statutes, the
research seeks to identify the legislative parameters within which the decisions of
eligibility for counsel are made for criminal defendants in state courts.
State statutes were analyzed to assess the extent to which state processes
for determining eligibility for counsel legislatively address these concerns. To
begin, the codes of all fifty states were searched to identify statutes relevant to the
issue at hand.89 After the statutes were compiled, they were reviewed for basic
framework and components.
From this initial review, several statutory
components related to eligibility determination processes were identified and
chosen for use in evaluating the elements of all state statutes. The chosen
components address issues such as the timing of the determination; how the
information on which the determination will be based is obtained; who makes the
determination; sanctions for defendants who intentionally provide false
information; and the nature of the eligibility criteria. When statutes contain clear
provisions addressing these issues, the determination process is made less
subjective and discretionary. Further, the effect of the provisions on objectivity is
cumulative–the more of them that are present in the statute, the more objective the
determination process becomes. Each of the provisions used as criteria in the
statute evaluation is described next.
A.

Provisions Describing the Process for Eligibility Determination

Statutes describing the process by which eligibility determinations for
court-appointed counsel can inject a degree of objectivity into the process.90 This
can be accomplished through statutes that establish when the determinations must
be made, set forth the means by which information for the determination will be
obtained, designate decision-making authority, provide for sanctions for the
submission of false information, and clearly indicate when the defendant must
repay the costs of the defense.
89

The searches were conducted using online resources - primarily Westlaw. The initial searches
were conducted using the search terms and phrases: indigent, needy, counsel, attorney, public
defender, defender, and right to counsel. The “hits” were reviewed and statutes relevant to the
appointment of counsel in criminal proceedings were “bookmarked’ or saved for further review.
In addition, state codes, also accessed via Westlaw, were also browsed and literature with cites to
relevant indigency statutes were reviewed to ensure all relevant statutes were identified.
90
See Phillips, supra note 14 (arguing generally for increased uniformity in the standards used to
determine eligibility for court-appointed counsel, but, aside from addressing the assignment of
decision-making authority (i.e., the court versus the public defender commission) does not speak
to the other process elements of timing, information collection, or controls for false statements.)
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Timing of the Eligibility Determination

Under the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Rothgery v. Gillesp County,
Texas, defendants’ right to counsel attaches at the time of the defendant’s first
court appearance.91 Therefore, when defendants claim that they cannot afford to
retain their own attorneys, the process to verify eligibility for court-appointed
counsel should commence no later than the first appearance. Some statutes
stipulate that the determination should be made before or upon the first
appearance,92 and others require a preliminary determination not later than
arraignment.93 Still other state statutes do not specify the timing, but opt for more
general standards, which indicate that the court must assign counsel to represent
the defendant, “without unnecessary delay”94 or that the determination should be
made in order for counsel to be available at “every critical stage of the
proceedings against him.”95 Statutes that establish precisely when eligibility for
court-appointed counsel will be determined leave less discretion to the court or
other decision-makers regarding when to initiate the process.
ii.

Methods Used to Obtain Information

The process is more objective when statutes set forth the methods that
must be used to obtain information that will be used in determining eligibility.
Many states’ statutes, for example, require defendants to complete some type of
written statement, describing their financial information, including financial
affidavits,96 certificates of indigency,97 financial statements,98 or applications99 for
use in assessing eligibility. Other statutes assess eligibility through a process
whereby defendants will be interrogated100 or interviewed,101 sometimes under
oath,102 about their financial condition.
iii.

Authority for Making the Determination

Objectivity also increases when statutes specify who must make the

91

554 U.S. 191 (2008).
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-852 (West 2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN § 31.120 (West 2015);
VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13, § 5236 (West 2015); and NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3901 (West 2015).
93
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 15:147 (2015).
94
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-8-101(2) (West 2015).
95
MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-32-9 3901(2) (West 2015); see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 180.060 (West
2015) (which similarly states “every stage of the proceedings”).
96
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-8-101 (West 2015); N.H. REV. STAT. § 604-A:2-c (West
2015); and NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3903 (2015).
97
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-87-213 (West 2015).
98
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27707 (West 2015).
99
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.52 (West 2015).
100
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4504 (West 2015).
101
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 211D, § 2A (2015).
102
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18-85-120 (West 2015).
92
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determination of eligibility. Many states may authorize judges103 or other court
officials104 to do so, while some delegate this responsibility to public defender
offices105 or even probation officers.106 Still others may choose to use an
approach employing a combination of officials to make and review eligibility
decisions.107 The assignment of responsibility for making the determination is
important as it sets forth who, ultimately, is accountable for the decision.
iv.

Sanctions for False Information

To protect public defender systems from abuse by those that do not need
court-appointed counsel, many state indigency determination statutes contain
language that specifies sanctions for defendants who intentionally provide false
information during eligibility determination. Most such statutes stipulate that
such an act constitutes perjury subject to criminal sanctions,108 but civil sanctions
are also a possibility in some states.109
v.

Recoupment of Costs for Defense

Presumably to try to offset some of the costs of defense by courtappointed counsel, some state statutes include language that requires defendants
who are able to repay some or all of the costs of their defense. Some statutes
specify that defendants must be made aware in advance of appointing counsel that
defendants will have to repay costs of defense if they are convicted of the
offense,110 while others stipulate that repayment is only required if a defendant
was “erroneously or improperly determined to be indigent.” 111 Whether such
recoupment provisions are prudent policy or even constitutional in some cases is
debatable.112 Requiring defendants to reimburse the state for all or some the costs
of their defense–should they later become able to do so–seems reasonable at first
glance. However, to the extent repayment requirements affect defendants’
103

See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-8-52; 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/113-3 (West 2015); See
also N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7A-453 (West 2015).
104
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5236 (West 2015) (where the court clerk makes the determination).
105
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-297 (West 2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-24 (West 2015);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 802-4; (West 2015); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 977.06 (West 2015).
106
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 211D § 2A (West 2015).
107
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-103 (West 2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 120.05 (West 2015);
W.VA. CODE ANN. § 29-21-16 (West 2015).
108
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18-85-120 (West 2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN § 31.120 (West
2015).
109
See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/113-3 (West 2015).
110
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.85.120 (West 2015) and KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4504 (West
2015).
111
See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-202 (West 2015).
112
See Helen A. Anderson, Penalizing Poverty: Making Criminal Defendants Pay for Their
Court-Appointed Counsel Through Recoupment and Contribution, 42 MICH. J. L. & REFORM
323 (2009). The author examines the pros and cons of recoupment provisions, cites to other
articles that address the subject, and ultimately concludes that recoupment provisions are not only
bad policy, but they also threaten defendants’ Sixth Amendment and equal protection rights.
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decisions to opt for court-appointed counsel due to fears of long-term debt or
property liens, a different picture emerges revealing risks to Sixth Amendment
and equal protection rights.113 The policy implications of recoupment provisions
are not the focus of this Article, but the analysis does consider which states’
statutes include them and a description of the nature of the provisions identified.
B.

Statutory Criteria for Determining Eligibility

The key components of statutes regarding defendants’ eligibility for courtappointed counsel are those specifying the criteria for eligibility. Where the
criteria lack specificity and decision-makers are afforded discretion in the
determination, mistakes can be costly to defendants’ rights or to the state’s
coffers. Eligibility criteria in state statutes range from a mention of a general
financial standard to descriptions of elaborate formulas and presumptive
eligibility (or non-eligibility) thresholds. State statutes may contain provisions
allowing partial eligibility for defendants who can afford to pay some, but not all,
of their defense costs. Several states’ statutes are completely devoid of any
mention of eligibility criteria; instead, these states delegate rule-making authority
to certain agencies and task them with establishing the criteria.114
i.

General Standard for Eligibility

Most state statutes contain some language regarding the standard used to
determine eligibility for court-appointed counsel. In fact, in some cases, a general
standard is the only guidance legislatures provide.115 Such general eligibility
standards may denote that defendants should be appointed an attorney if they are:
“without sufficient funds or assets to employ an attorney or afford other necessary
expenses incidental thereto;”116 “financially able to employ counsel;”117 “unable
to provide for the full payment of an attorney;”118 or unable “to retain legal
counsel without prejudicing one's financial ability to provide economic necessities
for one's self or one's family.”119
ii.

Specific Factors for Consideration

Many states offer more guidance by providing specific factors that courts
should use to make eligibility determinations. The Alaska legislature requires
113

Id. at 357–67.
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-103 (West 2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4602
(West 2015); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 29-07-01.1, 54-61-02 (West 2015).
115
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-87-201 (West 2015); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27706 (West 2015);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 802-4 (West 2015).
116
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-87-201 (West 2015).
117
See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27706 (West 2015); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 80–4 (West
2015).
118
See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-6-102 (West 2015).
119
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-3901 (West 2015).
114
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consideration of defendants’ “income, property owned, outstanding obligations,
and the number and ages of dependents.”120 Similarly, Oregon statutes suggest
consideration of a defendant’s “assets, liabilities, current income, dependents[,]
and other information….”121 While such statutes provide increased objectivity
compared to those only containing general eligibility standards, they still lack
clear benchmarks or thresholds against which defendants’ resources can be
compared to make determinations.
iii.

Presumptive Thresholds

Thus, statutes that contain the most objective eligibility criteria are those
that prescribe presumptive thresholds. In these states, defendants may be
presumed to be eligible for court-appointed counsel if they meet particular
requirements. Some statutes leave little room for court discretion when they
specify that defendants who earn income below a particular percentage of federal
poverty guidelines are presumed to be eligible.122 Even less subjective are
statutes that establish both lower and upper presumptive thresholds.123 Some
states apply presumptive thresholds based upon whether defendants already
receive government assistance such as food stamps, public housing, or statesubsidized medical insurance.124
The following section contains the results of the analysis of state statutes
related to the determination of eligibility for court-appointed counsel based on the
foregoing statutory criteria.
V.

RESULTS: THE NATURE OF STATUTORY GUIDANCE FOR ELIGIBILITY
DETERMINATIONS

Results revealed that state laws addressing the appointment of counsel
varied considerably with respect to organization and the comprehensiveness of
content guiding the eligibility determination processes. The research led to the
identification of relevant statutes in all states though the statutes varied greatly.
Almost all states had statutes that addressed some part of the eligibility
determination process and contained language establishing a general standard for
eligibility for court-appointed counsel.
In general, statutes were more
120

ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.85.120 (West 2015).
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151.485 (West 2015).
122
Louisiana statutes, for example, note that defendants earning less than 200% of the federal
poverty level are presumed to be eligible, while Montana statutes set the presumptive threshold at
less than 133% of the federal poverty level. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:175 (West 2015).
123
For example, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Ohio, Vermont, and Virginia have lower presumptive
thresholds, indicating that defendants who earn less than a particular percentage on the poverty
guidelines are eligible for court-appointed counsel, and upper thresholds, which exclude from
eligibility those earning above particular percentages unless extreme hardship is established. See
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.52 (West 2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-24 (West 2015); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 815.9 (West 2015); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 120-1-03 (West 2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.13, §
5236 (West 2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-159 (West 2015).
124
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 15:175 (2015); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.17 (West 2015).
121
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comprehensive in the coverage of the various components describing the process
of eligibility determination than in the stipulation of particular eligibility criteria
for use in making the decisions. Table 1 summarizes the results of the review by
indicating the elements present in the statutes (marked by an X or other indicator)
grouped according to whether the factors were related to the process or eligibility
criteria.
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Table 1. Elements Present in State Eligibility Statutes
Determination Process
Criteria for eligibility
State

Timing
Specif.

Describes
Process
to Collect
Info

Who
Decides?1

Penalty
For False
Info

Def.
Must
Repay

General
Standard

Specific
Factors

Presumptive
Threshold2

Partial
eligibility

Delegated

Alabama
X
C
X
X
X
X
L
X
Alaska
X
C
X
X
X
X
X
Arizona
C
X
Arkansas
X
C
X
X
X
X
X
California
X
C
X
X
X
Colorado
X
PD/C
X
X
X
Connecticut
X
PD
X
X
X
X
X
Delaware
X
PD/C
Florida
X
CC
X
X
X
X
L/U
Georgia
PD
X
X
L/U
X
Hawaii
X
PD
X
X
Idaho
X
X
C
X
X
X
L
Illinois
X
X
C
X
X
X
X
Indiana
X
C
X
X
X
Iowa
X
X
C
X
X
X
L/U
Kansas
X
C
X
X
X
X
X
Kentucky
X
X
C
X
X
X
Louisiana
X
X
C
X
X
L
Maine
X
Maryland
X
X
X
X
L
X
Massachusetts
X
PO
X
X
X
X
L
X
X
Michigan
X
X
C
X
X
L
X
Minnesota
X
C
X
X
X
L
Mississippi
X
C
X
X
Missouri
X
PD/C
X
X
X
X
X
X
Montana
X
C
X
X
X
L
Nebraska
X
X
C
X
X
X
X
Nevada
X
C
X
New Hampshire
X
C
X
X
X
X
X
New Jersey
X
C
X
X
X
X
New Mexico
X
X
C
X
X
X
X
New York
X
X
North Carolina
X
X
C
X
X
X
X
X
North Dakota
C
X
X
Ohio
X
PD/C
X
X
X
L/U
X
Oklahoma
X
C
X
X
X
U3
X
Oregon
X
C
X
X
X
X
X
Pennsylvania
X
PD
X
X
X
Rhode Island
X
PD
X
X
X
South Carolina
X
C
X
X
X
X
X
South Dakota
C
X
X
X
Tennessee
X
C
X
X
X
X
Texas
X
C
X
X
X
Utah
X
C
X
X
X
X
L
Vermont
X
X
CC
X
X
X
X
L/U
X
Virginia
X
C
X
X
X
L/U
Washington
X
X
C
X
X
X
L
X
West Virginia
X
PD/C
X
X
X
X
X
X
Wisconsin
X
PD
X
X
X
X
U
X
X
Wyoming
X
X
C
X
X
X
X
X
1
Denotes who, specifically is authorized to make the determination: C = Court; PD = Public Defender; CC =
Court Clerk; PO = Probation Officer
2
Denotes the nature of the presumptive threshold: L = Lower; U = Upper; U/L = Both Upper and Lower
3
Oklahoma’s statute stipulates that if the defendant is able to post bond, the fact constitutes a “rebuttable
presumption that the defendant is not indigent.”
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Statutory Treatment of the Eligibility Determination Process

All states except two (Maine and New York) have statutes that included at
least one element describing the process for the determination of eligibility for
court-appointed counsel. The most commonly present process-related elements
were those indicating who was authorized to make the decision, which was
present in forty-seven states (all except Maine, Maryland, and New York), and
those describing at least some part of the process by which information regarding
eligibility should be gathered, which was present in forty-two states (all except
Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Maine, New York, North Dakota, and
South Dakota). Language that establishes criminal or civil sanctions for
defendants who provide false statements about their financial condition were
found in the statutes of twenty-eight states. Elements setting forth the precise
timing requirements for determining eligibility for counsel were less common;
only fifteen states had such provisions.
The statutes of ten states contained all four of the elements describing the
process for determining the eligibility of counsel (Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky,
Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming).
Based on the criteria selected for evaluation, these states appear to have the least
subjective and most transparent, legislatively defined processes for assessing
eligibility. Such statutory guidance is helpful in ensuring that those who should
receive court-appointments do so; however, the characteristics of the assessment
process alone do not create the full picture. The eligibility criteria applied during
the process are even more critical to limiting unnecessarily broad discretion
toward the ultimate goal of procedural fairness.
As Table 1 shows, thirty-five states have statutes that allow the state to
seek some manner of reimbursement for some or all of the costs of defending
those defendants that it deems indigent. Seven states, however, provide for
recoupment only if the defendant is convicted or pleads guilty to the offense
charged;125 and another six allow recoupment only if the original indigency
decision was made incorrectly due to errors or false statements.126 Of the thirtyfive states with recoupment statutes, about half give the court flexibility in
deciding to pursue reimbursement from the defendant,127 and twenty-three states
have statutes that require the state to find a subsequent ability of the defendant to

125

Alaska, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Maryland, and North Carolina have statutes that
provide for recoupment from defendants only if they are convicted or plead guilty or no contest.
126
Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Utah statutes only provide for
recoupment in the event that the court finds that the defendant was not originally entitled to or
eligible for court-appointed counsel or if the court finds that the defendant made false statements
regarding his financial condition.
127
Seventeen state statutes indicate the court “may” seek reimbursement (Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio,
South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming), while 18 statutes stipulate that the
court “shall” do so (Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Vermont).
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pay as a condition of reimbursement.128 However, six states require the court to
seek recoupment notwithstanding the defendant’s ability to pay.129 The method of
repayment varies, but in at least nine states includes civil judgments and/or liens
against the defendants’ property.130 The Arkansas statute specifies that state
income tax refunds or lottery winnings “shall be intercepted” to pay for defense
costs.131
B.

Presence of Eligibility Criteria in State Statutes

Thirty-eight states had statutes that contained language articulating at least
a general standard of eligibility for counsel. As noted above, general standards
are very broad statements describing eligible requirements. Examples of such
statements include those indicating that defendants are “financially unable to
employ council,”132 “does not have the means at his disposal or available to him
to obtain counsel in his behalf,”133 and an “inability to retain legal counsel without
prejudicing one's financial ability to provide economic necessities for one's self or
one's family”134 are eligible for court-appointed attorneys. The statutes of twelve
states had no such general standard.135 Of those, five states’ (Arizona, Colorado,
Delaware, Maine, and North Dakota) statutes had none of the factors regarding
eligibility for counsel, and in all but one of these states, the legislatures delegated
the authority for establishing eligibility criteria to other agencies or commissions
(Arizona, Colorado, Maine, and North Dakota). Thus, Delaware was the only
state with statutes that were completely silent on anything related to criteria for
eligibility.
Thirty-six states had statutes that set forth specific factors that should be
considered when determining eligibility for court-appointed counsel, though some
of the factors were admittedly limited in the guidance set forth. For example,
South Carolina’s statute stipulates that the eligibility determination should simply
consider “all [of the person’s] assets,”136 and the Oklahoma statute states that the
consideration should include whether or not the defendant has been “released on
128

Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia statutes all contain
language suggesting that recoupment decisions would consider the defendant’s ability to pay–not
only at the time of the initial proceedings, but for some time after in most cases.
129
Statutes for Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina
have language indicating that the court “shall” seek reimbursement or repayment from the
defendant, but do not have any stipulations regarding the defendant’s ability to pay for those costs.
130
California, Florida, Kansas, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina,
and South Dakota statutes authorize the state to enter a judgment against the defendant and/or a
lien against his or her property.
131
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-87-213 (West 2015).
132
See, e.g., N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 717 (McKinney 2015).
133
See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 600.086 (West 2015).
134
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-3901 (West 2015).
135
Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, North Dakota,
and Oklahoma included no language defining indigency or setting a general standard for eligibility
of counsel.
136
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-3-30 (2015).
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bond.”137 Most state statutes that specify factors for consideration in indigency
determination decisions include several aspects related directly to a defendant’s
financial condition including: “the nature, extent, and liquidity of assets, the
disposable net income of the defendant, the nature of the offense, the effort and
skill required to gather pertinent information and the length and complexity of the
proceedings;”138 “income, property owned, outstanding obligations and the
number and ages of his dependents;”139 “current income prospects, taking into
account seasonal variations in income,” liquid assets, “fixed debts and
obligations,” child care, transportation, age, physical infirmity, efforts made to
obtain private legal representation;140 and comparison of the “defendant’s assets
and incomes with the minimum cost of obtaining qualified private counsel.”141
Thirteen states allowed for the consideration of the cost of and the defendant’s
ability to make bail or bond when determining eligibility for court-appointed
counsel,142 and in five of those cases, the statutes specifically say that counsel
should not be denied based on the defendant’s ability to do so.143 Seven states’
statutes stipulate that the income or assets of the defendant’s spouse or immediate
family–and in one case the defendant’s friends and employer–should be
considered when assessing eligibility for court-appointed counsel.144 Another
area of consideration in state eligibility criteria was related to the nature and
complexity of the case against the defendant, and recognizing that more complex
cases will cost more to defend, the statutes of six states contained such a
Additionally, New Jersey statutes required that defendants
provision.145
“demonstrate convincingly that he has consulted at least three private attorneys,
137

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1355A (West 2015). (The defendant’s ability to post bond is the
only factor for consideration specified in the Oklahoma statutes. As noted below, several other
state statutes mention consideration of the defendant’s ability to post bond and whether that factor
should be considered when determining eligibility.); See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 600.086 (West
2015) (requiring consideration of a defendant’s “ability to make bond, his income and the number
of persons dependent on him for support….”); See also, Kuhns, supra note 46, at 1810 (examining
the effects of using the ability to post bond on indigency determination and arguing that statutes
that presume a defendant is not indigent if he or she can post bond “forces individuals to make an
impossible choice between the right to counsel and liberty”).
138
ALA. CODE § 15-12-5 (2015).
139
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-16-5 (West 2015).
140
W.VA. CODE § 29-21-16 (West 2015).
141
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604-A:2-(c) (2015).
142
The states with statutes citing the cost and/or ability of the defendant to make bail/post bond
are Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee,
Texas, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia.
143
New Jersey, New Mexico, Texas, Vermont, and Washington prevent out right denial of counsel
simply because of the defendant’s ability to make bail or post bond.
144
The statutes of Indiana and Mississippi include spousal income as factors for consideration as
do the statutes in Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin except those that specify that the spouse’s
income should only be considered if the spouse is not the victim of the alleged crime of the
defendant. Montana’s statute includes consideration of others in the “household,” and New
Jersey’s includes reference to consideration of the willingness and ability of immediate family,
friends, and the defendant’s employer to assist with the costs of the defense.
145
The states with statutes that included consideration of the complexity of the case at hand in
eligibility determination proceedings include: Alabama, Kansas, Maryland, New Jersey, Utah, and
Washington.
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none of whom would accept the case for a fee within his ability to pay.”146
Finally, three states, Kansas, Minnesota, and Utah have statutory provisions
requiring the court to consider whether defendants may have transferred or
otherwise divested themselves of assets in anticipation of eligibility
determination.147
Eighteen states have statutes with criteria that specify presumptive
thresholds for eligibility. As noted above, presumptive thresholds are benchmarks
against which a defendant’s financial condition is compared to determine
eligibility. Benchmarks can be either categorical or quantitative in nature and can
be based on a minimum income (lower threshold) or a maximum income (upper
threshold) or both. Maryland’s statute, for example, sets a lower quantitative
presumptive threshold by stipulating that defendants’ whose “assets and net
annual income are less than 100 percent of the federal poverty guidelines” are
deemed eligible for public defender services with no additional needs
assessment.148 Both Louisiana and Washington statutes include both quantitative
and categorical lower presumptive eligibility thresholds. For example, Louisiana
statutes stipulate that a defendant who either earns less than twenty percent of
federal poverty guidelines or receives government assistance, such as food
stamps, Medicaid, or public housing is presumed to be eligible for courtappointed counsel.149 Similarly, Washington statutes presume defendants that
earn less than 125 percent of federal poverty guidelines or receive government
assistance benefits are indigent.150 Of the eighteen states with statutes that
include eligibility thresholds, ten provide for one or both of these types of lower
presumptive thresholds,151 and these states are denoted in Table 1 with an “L” in
the “Presumptive Threshold” column.
The Florida statute provides an example of an upper presumptive
threshold because it stipulates that a defendant having a net equity of $2,500 or
more in property, excluding the value of his or her home and vehicle worth under
$5,000, is presumed ineligible for court-appointed counsel.152 Also, in Georgia,
defendants earning more than 250 percent of the federal poverty guidelines are
presumed ineligible for court-appointed counsel, unless they can prove
extraordinary conditions or hardship.153 States with statutes that specify upper
146

N.J. PERM. STAT. § 2A:158A-14 (West 2015). See also W.VA. CODE § 29-21-16 (stipulating
that West Virginia eligibility decisions should consider whether the defendant “has made
reasonable and diligent efforts to obtain private legal representation[] and the result of those
efforts”).
147
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4513; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.17 (West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7732-202.
148
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 16-210 (West 2015). For defendant’s whose “assets and net
annual income equal or exceed 100 percent of the federal poverty guideline,” a more detailed
needs assessment will be conducted to determine eligibility.
149
LA. STAT. ANN § 15:147 (2015).
150
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.101.010 (West 2015).
151
Alabama, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Oklahoma,
Utah, and Washington all have statutory language establishing a lower presumptive threshold for
eligibility.
152
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.52 (West 2015).
153
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-2 (West 2015).

2016]

INDIGENCY STATUTES

189

presumptive thresholds are shown in Table 1 denoted with a “U.” Most states
with statutes that have upper presumptive thresholds also have lower thresholds.
Both Florida and Georgia, in addition to the upper thresholds described here also
have lower thresholds based on income-levels compared to the federal poverty
guidelines.154 Six states have both upper and lower thresholds, and these are
shown in Table 1 with an “U/L.”155 However, the statutes of two states only
provide for upper thresholds–or statutes that presumptively assume non-eligibility
or non-indigence. The Wisconsin statute presumes that defendants’ assets or
income are “available to the person to pay the costs of legal representation if the
assets exceed $2,500 in combined equity value” or if his or her “gross income
exceeds 115 percent of the federal poverty guidelines.”156 Oklahoma’s statutes
set a very strict upper threshold by stipulating that if the defendant is able to make
bail or post bond–with his own money or with the help of another person–this
“shall constitute a rebuttable presumption that the defendant is not indigent.”157
Statutes reflecting both lower and upper presumptive thresholds, with an
exception clause, such as in the Georgia statute described above, provide the most
objectivity in the eligibility determination, while maintaining needed flexibility to
consider dire situations that may compromise an otherwise financially capable
defendant’s ability to pay for all of his defense costs.
Twenty-three states have statutes with partial-eligibility provisions that
allow for the fact that some defendants may be able to afford to pay for some, but
not all, of their defense costs.158 Where partial eligibility provisions exist, courts
may appoint counsel but order the defendant to make co-payments to the public
defender or court.159 Partial eligibility provisions present flexibility needed by
many defendants who are not totally destitute, but simply cannot afford costly upfront retainer fees and hourly-billing rates of privately retained attorneys.
Finally, twenty-one states have statutes that specifically delegate all or a
portion of the authority for setting eligibility standards and determining the
process by which such determinations should be made.160 In Colorado, for
example, the responsibility for setting eligibility criteria lies with the state
154

Florida presumes that defendants that earn less than 200 percent of federal poverty guidelines
to be indigent and eligible for court-appointed counsel. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.52 (West 2015).
Georgia presumes that defendants that earn less than 100 percent of federal poverty guidelines to
be indigent and eligible for court-appointed counsel. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-2 (West 2015).
155
Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Ohio, Vermont, and Virginia statutes include language establishing
both upper and lower presumptive eligibility and non-eligibility thresholds.
156
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 977.02 (West 2015).
157
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1355A (West 2015).
158
Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have
provisions requiring defendants who cannot afford to pay all but can afford to pay a portion of
their defense costs to do so.
159
See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 110, at 329-32.
160
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts,
Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Carolina, Texas, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming statutes delegate the responsibility for
establishing eligibility criteria or standards to a particular state agency.
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supreme court.161 Indiana statutes delegate the same authority to the state’s
Public Defender Commission,162 while in Massachusetts, the Committee for
Public Counsel is responsible,163 and in Kansas it is the job of the State Board of
Indigent Defense Services to set eligibility standards.164 In North Dakota, every
aspect related to indigent defense, including establishing criteria, creating
processes, and making the ultimate determination is the purview of the North
Dakota Commission on Legal Counsel for Indigents.165
C.

Overall Comprehensiveness of States’ Statutes

The characteristics of both the process used and the eligibility criteria
applied to ascertain eligibility for counsel are critical to any overall judgment
regarding state statute comprehensiveness and objectivity. To the extent that the
criteria chosen to evaluate the state statutes in this case (notwithstanding the
elements accounting for recoupment of defense costs and the delegation of the
determination duties) can be said to be indicative of clarity and objectivity in the
determination process, one could argue that the effects are cumulative. When
more of these specific elements are contained in state statutes, the less subjective
the determination process becomes. With that in mind, the data collected for this
Article and reflected in Table 1 was used to generate the sum of the number of
statutory elements present in each state’s statutes. For example, the first state
listed in Table 1 is Alabama, and the table shows that Alabama statutes include
six of the eight key elements (again, not including the “Repay” or “Delegated”
elements). The six elements contained in the Alabama statutes include:
description of process to collect eligibility information (“Describes Process to
Collect Info”), assignment of who is responsible for the eligibility determination
(“Who Decides?), stipulation of penalties for defendants that provide false
information (“Penalty for False Info”), language stating a general eligibility
standard (“General Standard”), specific factors that should be considered when
assessing eligibility (“Specific Factors”), and a lower presumptive threshold for
eligibility (“Presumptive Threshold” = “L”). Thus, by summing the number of
elements, Alabama would receive a “score” of six. Maine statutes do not include
any of the eight key elements and would receive scores of zero, while Arizona,
New York, and North Dakota would each receive a score of one because statues
of those states only have one element each. This scoring was done for all states in
order to determine which states had relatively more comprehensive and objective
legislative direction for determining which defendants are eligible for counsel.
Using this methodology, Vermont and Washington scored the highest, because
the statutes of those states contained all eight criteria reviewed. The frequency
data were graphed, and the results (shown in Figure 1 with state abbreviations
placed within the frequency bars) indicated a slightly skewed distribution of the
161
162
163
164
165

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-103 (West 2015).
IND. CODE ANN. § 33-40-5-4 (West 2015).
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 211D § 2 (West 2015).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4504 (West 2015).
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 54-61-02 (West 2015).
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number of statutory elements across the fifty states, with most states having
between four and six.
Figure 1. Number of Statutory Elements (Eligibility and Process) Present per State

ND

SD

WI

WA

Based on this analysis it can be concluded that Vermont and Washington
(with eight elements) and Massachusetts, Michigan, and Wisconsin (with seven
elements) have statutes that, based on the criteria chosen, provide the most
objective means for determining eligibility for assigned counsel. Obviously, this
simple analysis does not take into account the notion that all of the elements
chosen for this review may not represent equally important aspects of state
statutes. For example, noted above was the argument that statutes that stipulate
both upper and lower thresholds provide a more objective basis for determining
eligibility for court-appointed counsel. Such considerations are not taken into
account here, because the method was used to simply get a measure of how states
stack up against one another. Additionally, it could be argued that the most
important elements of the analysis should be limited to the ones that focus on the
criteria for determining which defendants are eligible for court-appointed counsel,
and not the process by which the determination is made. Results for limiting the
analysis to the four eligibility components–general eligibility standards, specific
factors to be considered, presumptive eligibility thresholds, and partial eligibility
provisions are in Figure 2. Only seven states have statutes with all four eligibility
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components, while 10 states have fewer than two of the components. Most states,
however, have at least two or three of the eligibility components, and therefore,
provide some legislative guidance for the eligibility determination decisions.
Figure 2. Number of Eligibility Elements Present per State

VI.

CONCLUSION

Results of this Article indicate that states statutes vary considerably with
respect to the extent to which they prescribe processes and eligibility criteria for
determining the need for court-appointed counsel. Some states’ statutes provide
virtually no direction on the issue, while others contain several sound and
objective criteria for use in making eligibility decisions. While this Article
provides a starting point for understanding how decisions to appoint counsel are
made in the states, at this point it would be problematic to draw firm conclusions.
As noted above, state statutes represent just one source of information related to
how states determine indigency. To gain a more complete and accurate picture,
analysis of the administrative guidelines of agencies and commissions as well as
the case law of each state is necessary. Nevertheless, state legislation serves the
important function of creating the basic parameters within which lower courts and
agency decisions are typically made. Therefore, legislatures that firmly establish
sound, objective criteria upon which determinations of eligibility can be made,
help ensure that defendants’ rights will be protected and counsel will be appointed
when needed.
Notwithstanding the fact that several state legislatures have set forth
clearly objective standards for the determination of eligibility, this Article makes
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apparent that many states lack such legislative guidance. These states leave broad
discretion to magistrates and trial court judges to make these decisions. Mistakes
in making that decision which result in denial of court-appointed counsel for a
defendant who cannot afford to hire his or her own have potentially serious
implications. While courts’ discretionary decisions can normally be reviewed for
clear error and abuse of discretion, those standards are often difficult to prove.
This would particularly be the case for defendants who do not have the assistance
of an attorney to file an appeal. A lack of objective criteria to guide eligibility
decision-making can lead to unequal treatment under the law, and unfettered
judicial discretion increases the risk that those decisions will be made based on
personal prejudices or biases. Discriminatory decisions clearly could lead to
violations of defendants’ Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Here,
legislatures and judiciaries should learn from problems with judicial discretion in
the area of criminal sentencing.166 Sentencing disparities that raised concerns
about discrimination and inequality have led to substantive changes in the way
sentences are determined, by significantly reducing judicial discretion through
sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimum sentencing structures.167 Clearly,
the criminal justice system has seen the effects of a lack of objective standards on
particular classes of defendants, thus legislatures should take note and apply those
lessons learned in other areas, including the appointment of counsel.
The right to counsel is a fundamental right, but when those who require
court-appointed counsel exercise that right, the government must take on the role
of adequately managing and funding public defender systems. Today, as noted
above, most accounts indicate that the nation’s state public defender systems are
in a state of crisis due to huge caseloads and a lack of funding. Denying counsel
to those that need it and are facing a loss of liberty should not be the means to
decrease public defender caseloads. Perhaps a different approach is warranted,
specifically, examining a different way to control inputs into the system.
This nation’s paramount criminal justice paradigm of the last thirty years
has no doubt contributed to the problem by increasing the demand on the criminal
justice system. The “get-tough on crime” philosophy accompanied by the “Wars
on Crime, Drugs, and Terror” has led to increased criminalization of offenses
once considered minor.168 One of the results of this phenomenon has been an
increase in the number of offenses for which loss of liberty is a potential sanction.
In addition, harsher punishment strategies have also increased the demands on the
criminal justice system by incarcerating more defendants for longer periods of
time. This is particularly evident when the impact of three-strikes laws and
mandatory minimum sentencing schemes are considered.169 One important
consequence of the expansion of criminal laws and sanctions for breaking those
laws is the increased demand on public defender systems.170
166

Phillips, supra note 14, at 670-72.
Id.
168
NATIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMMITTEE, supra note 55, at 70.
169
Sara Steen & Rachel Bandy, When the Policy Became the Problem: Criminal Justice in the
New Millennium, 9 PUNISH. & SOC’Y 5 (2007).
170
Greg Hollon, After the Federalization Binge: A Civil Liberties Hangover, 31 HARV. C. R. - C.L.
L. REV. 499 (1996).
167
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The workload on the public defender system and the concomitant drain on
state budgets are just two of the many negative effects of the criminalization trend
of the last three decades. The other numerous deleterious effects need not be
itemized here; however, their combined impact on the justice system, government
as a whole, and society indicates a change may be necessary. Perhaps such a
change–one in which the justice system is more focused on identifying and
addressing front-end factors related to the sources and root causes of crime and
less on increased criminalization and retribution–could lead to benefits across
many facets of society, not just in decreasing the public defender caseload.
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APPENDIX
Table 2. State Statutes Analyzed
STATE
ALABAMA
ALASKA
ARIZONA
ARKANSAS
CALIFORNIA
COLORADO
CONNECTICUT
DELAWARE
FLORIDA
GEORGIA
HAWAII
IDAHO
ILLINOIS
INDIANA
IOWA
KANSAS
KENTUCKY
LOUISIANA
MAINE
MARYLAND
MASSACHUSETTS
MICHIGAN
MINNESOTA
MISSISSIPPI
MISSOURI
MONTANA
NEBRASKA
NEVADA
NEW HAMPSHIRE
NEW JERSEY
NEW MEXICO
NEW YORK
NORTH CAROLINA
NORTH DAKOTA
OHIO
OKLAHOMA
OREGON
PENNSYLVANIA
RHODE ISLAND
SOUTH CAROLINA
SOUTH DAKOTA
TENNESSEE
TEXAS
UTAH
VERMONT
VIRGINIA
WASHINGTON
WEST VIRGINIA
WISCONSIN
WYOMING

STATUTES
ALA. CODE

§ 15-12-1, 5, 25 (2015)
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.85.110, 120, 170 (West 2015)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-499.09, § 11-584 (2015)
ARK. CODE ANN.§ 16-87-201, 213 (West 2015)
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27706, § 27707 (West 2015) CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.8 (West 2015)
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-103, 106 (West 2015)
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-289, 297-298 (West 2015)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29 § 4602 (West 2015)
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.52 (West 2015)
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-2, 24, 51, 80 (West 2015)
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 802-2, 3, 4, 6 (West 2015)
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-852, 854 (West 2015)
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/113-3, 5/133.3.1 (West 2015)
IND. CODE ANN. § 33-40-5-4, 6, 7, § 35-33-7-6 (West 2015)
IOWA CODE ANN. § 815.9 (West 2015)
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4503, 4504 (West 2015)
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.110,120 (West 2015)
LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:143, 175 (2015)
ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 4 § 1804 (2015)
WEST'S MD. CODE ANN. § 16-210, 211 (West 2015)
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 211D § 2, 2A, ch. 261 § 27A, 27B (2015)
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.991 (West 2015)
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.17, 18, 20 (West 2015)
MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-32-9, § 99-15-15 (West 2015)
MO. ANN. STAT. § 600.086, 090 (West 2015)
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-8-101, § 47-1-111 (West 2015)
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-3901-3903, 3908, 3916 (West 2015)
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.188, § 180.060 (West 2015)
N.H. REV. STAT. Ann. § 604-A:2, A:2c, A2d, A:9, A:10 (2015)
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:158A-2, 14, 15.1, 16, 17 (West 2015)
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-16-2, 5, 7 (West 2015)
N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 717, N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW § 832 (McKinney 2015)
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7A-450, 453, 455, 456, 498 (West 2015)
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 54-61-01, 02, § 29-07-01.1 (West 2015)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 120.05, OHIO ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 120-1-03 (West 2015)
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1355A, 1355.14 (West 2015)
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151.485, 487, 489 (West 2015)
16 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9960.6, 8 (West 2015)
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-15-8, 9, 11 (West 2015)
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-3-10, 30, 45, 340 (2015)
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-40-6, 10, 11 (2015)
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-201, 202 (West 2015)
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 1.051, 26.04, TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 79.034 (West
2015)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-202 (West 2015)
VT. STAT. ANN. tit.13, § 5201, 5236, 5238 (West 2015)
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-159, 161 (West 2015)
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.101.010, 020 (West 2015)
W.VA. CODE ANN. § 29-21-16 (West 2015)
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 967.06, § 977.02, 06, 07 (West 2015)
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-6-102, 106, 108 (West 2015)

